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ABSTRACT 
The vast majority of research on online trolling focused on Western cultures. Given the role context plays in 
shaping online interactions, it is important to take into account its socio-cultural context and investigate the role 
of national culture, by conducting research into trolling in Eastern cultures. In this paper, we attempt to begin 
addressing this gap by focusing on Chinese collective trolling, looking at Sina Weibo’s PG One case. Specifically, 
we aim to identify who are the major players, what are the metaphors they use, and what are the major trolling 
tactics employed in Chinese collective trolling event. Using a mixed-method approach, we analyzed 2,004 posts 
and 9,967 comments on Sina Weibo’s PG One case, of which 480 were sampled for thematic content analysis. 
Major contributions of this study include an account of collective trolling in Chinese cultural context that is 
characterized by role switching between trolls, bystanders, and victims during the various stages of the event. 
We conclude with suggestion for future research directions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Trolling can be defined as set of diverse context-dependent online behaviors that are pseudo-sincere, intentional, provocative 
and repetitive. Online trolling has become an increasingly pervasive and dynamic phenomenon in online communities (Fich-
man & Sanfilippo, 2016). Scholars described it as a context-dependent (e.g., Fichman & Sanfilippo, 2015; Herring, Job-Sluder, 
Scheckler, & Barab, 2002; Sanfilippo, Yang & Fichman, 2017), intentional (Hardaker, 2010; Shachaf & Hara, 2008), provoc-
ative (Hardaker, 2010), and repetitive (Fichman & Sanfilippo, 2016; Suler, 2004) behavior by an individual toward other indi-
viduals or groups (Fichman & Sanfilippo, 2016). Phillips (2015) noticed cross-national diversity of online trolling and men-
tioned various motivations of trolling behaviors in Australia, Britain and the US respectively. Fichman and Sanfilippo (2016) 
call for more research on the complex socio-cultural relationships between culture and trolling.  
Yet, most of the literature refer to online trolling cases in the context of Western cultures. While online trolling in Eastern 
cultural context, such as China, began attracting scholarly attention (e.g., de Seta’s, 2013; Yang, et al., 2017; Yang & Fichman, 
2017), it is still unclear whether trolling behaviors exist in Chinese online communities, and how Chinese collectivistic culture 
might play into online trolling. Further, since Chinese Internet context is unique and characterized by the Great Firewall, it is 
possible that trolling in this context have distinct characteristics compared to online trolling in Western context. Given the role 
context plays in shaping socio-technical interactions (Kling, 2007), it is important to consider the contextual impact when 
studying online trolling (Sanfilippo, Fichman, & Yang, 2017). Thus, it is necessary to gain a better understanding of online 
trolling in various socio-cultural contexts and not to overlook trolling manifestation in Eastern cultures. In this paper, we con-
duct a study of collective trolling in China, focusing on Sina Weibo’s PG One case study. We aim to identify 1) who are the 
major players; 2) what are the metaphors they use; and 3) what are the major trolling tactics they employ in this collective 
trolling event. The paper structure is as follows: First, we provide a brief background and related work on online trolling, and 
then we describe our method, along with a description of our data. Next, we discuss our case analysis, answering the three 
research questions, and we conclude with discussion and suggestion for future research. 
BACKGROUND 
Internet and Sina Weibo use in China  
Based on the latest report from the China Internet Network Information Center (2018), there are 751 million users in China (as 
of June, 2017), accounting for one fifth of the total number of Internet users in the world. The Internet penetration rate in China 
reached 55%, exceeding the global average by 4.6% (CNNIC, 2018). Furthermore, due to Internet censorship in China, known 
as “Great Firewall”, many Western popular social network platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, are blocked in mainland 
China (Ensafi, et al., 2015). Instead, Chinese users use the Sina Weibo platform—a Twitter-like website— to chat and share 
information with other users. One of the obvious difference between social network sites in China compared with the West is 
the lack of anonymity on Chinese platforms, while on some Western platforms, users are anonymous. On these western plat-
forms, users can interact online without revealing who they are, where they come from, how old are they, and so on. However, 
on all Chinese social media platforms, all users online accounts are connected to their real-life ID. Even when users use various 
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online usernames and try to disguise their real identities, age, and gender, the Chinese authorities can track their activities. This 
context clearly has an effect on norms of behaviors on Chinese social media platforms. 
Sina Weibo is a popular social media site with over 361 million monthly active users and 159 million average daily active users 
(Noonan, 2017). The platform is currently the dominant microblogging service provider in China (Lin et al., 2013) and a major 
source of commentary on a wide range of topics. For example, about 100 million messages are posted daily on Sina Weibo 
(Jiang, Wang, Tsou, & Fu, 2015). On Sina Weibo, a user may post, mention, or talk to other people using “@UserName”, add 
hashtags with “#HashName#”, follow other users to make their posts appear in one's own timeline, repost with “//@UserName” 
(similar to Twitter's retweet function “RT @UserName”), select posts for one's favorites list, and verify the account, when the 
user is a celebrity. Just like on Twitter, there are also “VIP” accounts on Sina Weibo, which are called “verified users” and have 
a yellow “V” sign after their names. These verified users attract thousands of followers, creating “celebrity-centric” social 
networks on Sina Weibo, which play an important role in disseminating latest events, controversial opinions and breaking news 
(Wang, Lei, & Xu, 2015). Most verified users are influential people offline as well, and many are public figures, celebrities, or 
organizations’ accounts. The major difference from Twitter is that Sina Weibo is used almost exclusively by Chinese language 
speakers (Jiang, Wang, Tsou, & Fu, 2015). In order to evade the multiple levels of Sina Weibo censorship, many Chinese 
netizens use clever methods to elude the suppression, for example posting images instead of more easily censored text or using 
memes (Sullivan, 2014).  
Online trolling 
As online trolling increased in pervasiveness, the term is used as an umbrella term for different phenomena, from serious and 
deviant to humorous or ideological driven behavior (Sanfilippo, Fichman, & Yang, 2018); it is context-dependent phenomena 
(Fichman & Sanfilippo, 2015). Trolling is associated with direct aggression, flaming, spraying, and even cyber bullying (Harda-
kar, 2010; de Seta, 2013). Perceptions of trolling varies between perpetrators, victims, bystanders, scholars, the media, and the 
public at large. On one hand, trolls often justify their behaviors ideologically or by the high moral disengagement experienced 
with respect to their online activities (Suler & Phillips 1998), while on the other hand, scholars and the media often frame 
trolling as unjustifiable and depraved acts (Bishop 2014).  
While trolling behaviors varies widely, the literature emphasizes deviant and negative behaviors, which have many common-
alities with flaming (e.g., Hardaker, 2010; Herring, Job-Sluder, Scheckler, & Barab, 2002) and hacking (e.g., Shachaf & Hara, 
2010; Suler & Phillips, 1998). Fichman and Sanfilippo (2016) emphasize that “not all trolling is equal” and claim that trolling 
is more complicated than mere deviant behavior leading to negative impact, and recent scholarly works began to describe light-
hearted, humorous, or ideological trolling (e.g., Phillips & Milner, 2017; Sanfilippo, Fichman & Yang, 2018). Because online 
trolling is a socio-technical phenomenon, with context-dependent manifestation that varies from one community to another and 
from one platform to another, it may exhibit different behavioral patterns in different countries (Fichman & Sanfilippo, 2016), 
and more specifically, its manifestation in China may be more collectivistic than trolling in Western cultures (Yang & Fichman, 
2017). Thus, by using a mixed method analysis of Sina Weibo PG One’s case to identify behavioral patterns of collective 
trolling, that flourish under the Chinese firewall, this paper aims to extend our understanding of online trolling in context. 
Specifically, we aim to identify who are the major players, what are the metaphors they use, and what are the major trolling 
tactics employed in this Chinese collective trolling event.   
METHOD 
We employed a mixed method approach and analyzed 2,004 posts and 9,967 comments on Sina Weibo, of which 480 were 
sampled for content analysis. The event of interest in our case study of Chinese collective trolling occurred in January 2018 
and is referred to as PG One in this paper. PG One is the nickname of Wang Hao (王昊), one of China’s best-known rappers, 
whose victory on The Rap of China competition brought him over four million followers on Sina Weibo platform (Fan, 2018). 
As part of the method section, we first describe the setting, PG One case study, and then follow with the description of our data 
collection and analysis. 
PG One case study  
The PG One case study illustrated an example of Chinese collective trolling on Sina Weibo that was observed during the time 
period of Jan. 7th, 2018 7 p.m. to Jan. 8th, 2018 5 a.m. (China Time). The event of interest to our case study started when some 
Sina Weibo users criticized one of his songs for containing degrading and out-of-line lyrics (Jiayun, 2018). Then, a magazine 
published by the central government, known as the Tower of Violet Light (TVL), and the Communist Youth League1, continued 
posting and harshly criticizing the dark lyrics of PG One another song, “Christmas Eve”, for encouraging teenagers to use drugs 
and insulting women. TVL also added two photos of a few lines from the lyrics of the song “Christmas Eve”, to represent the 
                                                          
 
1  The Communist Youth League is a youth movement of the P. R. China for youth between the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight, run by the Communist Party 
of China (CPC).  
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song's general spirit. PG One’s fans (PGF) learned about TVL’s posts on Sina Weibo, and a group of his fans, who misunder-
stood TVL to be the name of a restaurant, planned a revenge. Their revenge plan (which was based on their misunderstanding 
of TVL to be a restaurant name) included spreading cockroaches in the “restaurant”. Their plan also included a negative cam-
paign on a popular e-commerce site in China, Taobao, against the restaurant, claiming that the restaurant, TVL, uses sewer 
sludge skimmed oil for cooking, posting “Gutter Oil of TVL”. At this point, around 6 p.m. on Jan. 7, 2018 (China Time), a 
microblogger (Xiaojiananfang), who was a member of PGF’s QQ (an instant messaging software service) task-force group, 
posted the plan of the PGF QQ group chat on Sina Weibo. Following this post, the PGF plan, known now as “Gutter Oil of 
TVL”, became viral and turned into a trending search topic on Sina Weibo on January 8, 2018 (China Time). The trending 
search topic increasingly attracted users’ attention and Sina Weibo platform had been flooded with thousands of posts and 
comments over a 10 hours period. We collected all the Sina Wiebo’s PG One case study posts during this event for our analysis. 
Data collection & analysis 
We collected posts that were a part of this 10 hours event on Sina Weibo on Jan. 7th, 2018 7 p.m. to Jan. 8th, 2018 5 a.m. (China 
Time). The basic dataset consists of 2,872 posts that had the keywords “Gutter Oil of TVL” (紫光阁地沟油), in chronological 
order, and 9,967 comments replying to these posts. Table 1 and Figure 1 describe the dataset, distribution of posts and comments 
as of Jan. 8, 2018, 5 a.m. (China Time).  
 
Figure 1. Distribution of posts and comments during the event 
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Posts 2 29 351 610 439 617 445 215 87 77 
Comments 1 90 672 1656 1728 2634 1629 897 360 301 
Table 1. Posting frequency during the event 
Since the dataset is relatively large, and the distribution of posts is irregular, we designed a two-stage sampling process with 
non-probability at each and employed a judgment sampling strategy. This judgement sampling method uses purposeful criteria 
in choosing the sample, to include cases that have the most strategic position to provide the information needed (Sekaran & 
Boogie, 2010); it is based on our own judgements about the representative posts (Kothari, 1990). Although we were well aware 
of its limitations in representing the event, this method was applied in the selection of the posts since we felt that the sample 
selected could serve the research purpose better (Köksal, & Riddle, 2007). 
Based on posting frequencies, we identified 5 primary segments of time periods: the first two hours were merged into one 
segment, the first stage, and the last 4 hours were merged into one stage, the last stage. Each stage stands for a particular turning 
point of the event as follow: Stage 1: earliest posts; Stage 2: First peak–turning into hottest search topics; Stage 3: Maintain 
momentum; Stage 4: Peak; Stage 5: Calm down.  
Time period 
 
Event stages 
Numbers of posts, 
comments & chats 
per min 
Number of 
posts sam-
pled 
Number of 
comments 
sampled 
Number of 
chats sampled 
19:00-21:59 Stage 1: Earliest posts 2.03 12 46 16 
22:00-22:59 
Stage 2: First peak – turning 
into hottest search topics 
37.77 18 91 13 
23:00-23:59 Stage 3: Maintain momentum 36.12 17 68 12 
00:00-00:59 Stage 4: Peak 54.18 18 84 9 
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01:00-04:59 Stage 5: Calm down 16.75 15 51 10 
Total 20.40 80 340 60 
Table 2. Five stages sample 
We found that many posts and comments added some screenshots of PGF group chats, which were included in our sample due 
to their informative nature. This sample includes a total of 480 posts:  80 posts, 340 comments, and 60 chats from the five 
segments was used in our content analysis (Table 2).  
We designed a codebook, with 5 categories (stakeholder group, trolling role, content, and trolling tactic) and 49 codes. Codes 
were derived from prior work on trolling (Sanfilippo, Yang, & Fichman, 2017b), which we continuously revised during the 
coding process, adding codes that originated from our data.  
We manually coded and analyzed the samples from these five stages using open coding (Corbin & Strauss, 2014). Coding was 
conducted at the level of individual posts by the first author and a second coder coded a subset of the data to ensure coding 
reliability.  Inter-coder reliability was high, at 82.5% of agreement.   
FINDINGS 
This section includes three parts as we aim to identify 1) who are the major players; 2) what are the metaphors they use; and 3) 
what are the major trolling tactics employed in Chinese collective trolling event.   
1)   Major players 
A few stakeholder groups were involved in our collective trolling event. Stakeholders switched their roles during the event 
between trolls, bystanders, and victims of trolls. We labeled posters group affiliation as one of the following four stakeholder 
groups: 1) PG One’s Fans (PGF); 2) Tower of Violet Light (TVL); 3) General Participants (GP), those who lack other group 
affiliation; or 4) Verified users (VIP), those who typically hold a celebrity status. Based on self-proclaimed identity and the 
context of each post, we also assigned to each user one of three roles: 1) troll; 2) bystander; or 3) victim. Table 3 presents the 
number of posts by group in each stage that reveals the event pattern: an ephemeral but aggressive post-flood that increased 
quickly in a short time dominated by GP. This group, GP, generated most of the posts, overwhelming the other stakeholder 
groups during each of the five stages. PGF’s and TVL’s posting pattern have both a small-scale fluctuation pattern; for PGF 
the peak is in the first stage, and for TVL in the third stage, while VIP exhibit a decreased posting pattern as the event progressed. 
 
Posts by stakeholder 
groups at stage 
PGF 
Number of posts 
(percent of posts at 
stage out of all PGF 
posts) 
TVL 
Number of posts 
(percent of posts at 
stage out of all TVL 
posts) 
GP 
Number of posts 
(percent of posts at 
stage out of all GP 
posts) 
VIP 
Number of posts 
(percent of posts at 
stage out of all VIP 
posts) 
Stage 1: Earliest posts 22 (35.48%) 0 (0%) 46 (12.17%) 13 (33.33%) 
Stage 2: First peak-turning 
into hottest search topics 
12 (19.35%) 0 (0%) 95 (25.13%) 14 (35.90%) 
Stage 3: Maintain momen-
tum 
11 (17.74%) 1 (100%) 83 (21.96%) 6 (15.38%) 
Stage 4: Peak 10 (16.13%) 0 (0%) 87 (23.02%) 5 (12.82%) 
Stage 5: Calm down 7 (11.29%) 0 (0%) 67 (17.72%) 1 (2.56%) 
Table 3. Posts by stakeholder groups in Five stages (N= 480) 
Table 4 provides the distribution of posts from each of the four stakeholder groups by each of the three trolling roles. At the 
beginning, PGF planned to troll the TVL, but later PGF became the target-group, which was trolled by TVL and thousands of 
GP users. As is shown in Table 4, PGF, GP, VIP all played more than one role during the entire event, they switched roles 
between trolls, bystanders, and victims of trolls.  
Stakeholder groups 
by trolling roles 
PGF 
Number of posts 
(percent of posts by 
role and stakeholder 
out of total posts) 
TVL 
Number of posts 
(percent of posts by 
role and stakeholder 
out of total posts) 
GP 
Number of posts 
(percent of posts by 
role and stakeholder 
out of total posts) 
VIP 
Number of posts 
(percent of posts by 
role and stakeholder 
out of total posts) 
Trolls 41 (8.54%) 0 (0.00%) 166 (34.58%) 18 (3.75%) 
Victims 15 (3.13%) 1 (0.21%) 12 (2.50%) 0 (0.00%) 
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Bystanders 6 (1.25%) 0 (0.00%) 200 (41.67%) 21 (4.38%) 
Table 4. Posts of stakeholder groups by trolling roles (N= 480) 
The trolls 
In this event, all stakeholder groups trolled at one point or another. At first, PGF were planning a revenge by a collective trolling 
campaign. In past events, the PGF group was involved in a well-organized and well-planned actions in support and admiration 
of PG One; these events lasted a couple of hours or days. The plan was to spread cockroaches into what they believed to be a 
restaurant, who criticized their idol, PG One, and to follow up by posting online about it. They had also planned to employ 
water-army2 to post about TVL’s terrible cooking practices, using the idea of “Gutter Oil of TVL”. However, before PGF took 
action, their plan had leaked out, and they became the target of collective trolling. Toward the end of the event, PGF turned 
into the main trolling target in reverse-trolling by TVL, GP as well as VIP; most of the trolling at this point have been posted 
by GP. 
Bystanders 
The bystander role includes mainly GP and VIP accounts. While the GP group trolled the most and have been trolled the most 
of all four stakeholder groups, most of them played a bystander role during the entire event. The VIP, in addition to retweeting 
TVL’s post, which reported on the PGF trolling plan, some VIP also added self-mockery posts and trolled the PGF. For example, 
The Communist Youth League (VIP account) posted jokingly: “Would their next exposed target be the small workshop that 
sells green rice balls? Afraid. JPG”. In fact, VIP users played an important role in accelerating the development of this event 
by broadcasting it to their followers and by simply reacting to it. For instance, at 08:45 p.m. on January 7, 2018 (China Time), 
a well-known microblogger, Hacker Kevin, posted a post that was reposted thousands of times and generated 9,511 reaction 
comments. With the development of the event, more and more bystanders engaged in trolling PGF, together forming a viral 
group trolling; these bystanders turned into trolls and were engaged in this collective trolling event.  
The victims  
The victim role was played by TVL, PGF, and GP users. TVL at first was mistakenly confused to be a restaurant, was the target 
of the PGF trolling, as it was criticized for “Using gutter oil”, “Brand Deception”, and “Eat cockroaches in the food!”. However, 
at 11:30 p.m. on January 7, 2018 (China Time), TVL made one post that self-mockingly described itself as a scared baby, who 
was too “weak, poor, and helpless” to fight with PGF, as they were neither ignoring posts related to “Gutter Oil of TVL”, nor 
clarifying their position; instead they, as a scared baby, only hide in their dining room and kept shivering. This same post also 
mocked PGF users as if they were pretending to be asleep. This post reversed TVL’s role from being trolled by PGF to reverse-
trolling PGF, turning PGF into victims. This TVL post was reposted thousands of times and pushed this trolling “war” to its 
peak, when PGF was the new target of trolling.  
2)   Content 
The thematic components of the posts and comments help us understand this collective trolling action better. Table 5 presents 
the top 5 topics and metaphors in each stakeholder groups’ posts. There were four interesting metaphors: 1) this event was 
metaphorically referred to as “war” (战争); 2) participants who supported TVL were referred to as“The friendly army” (友
军); 3) participants who supported PGF were referred to as “The enemy” (敌军); and 4) participants who watched the trolling 
event unfolding were referred to as “Onlooker” (吃瓜群众), a group of bystanders.  
The most frequently posted metaphor was “the friendly army”, as most posts and comments claimed their support of TVL or 
opposing PGF and indicating that they were the friendly army. Examples for the friendly army metaphor include: “Come on, 
baby purple” (加油，紫宝宝), referring to the literal meaning of TVL, Tower of Violet Light, and “Must ban this cult” (封杀
这种邪教), referring to PGF as a cult of PG One fans . Interestingly, not all of the trolls trolled directly, as many of them, 
specifically GP users, intentionally pretended to be members of PGF group. They pseudo sincerely condemned “Gutter Oil of 
TVL” or supported PGF, adding a dog's head emoticon to mean the opposite, and that they actually supported TVL instead. 
Users who post or comment added a dog’s head emoticon ( ) at the end of their comment to indicate that they are part of the 
friendly army, and thus expressing exactly the opposite meaning. For instance, a user posted the following: “Let’s get together 
as PGF, and I can drive you to the mental hospital” (各位万友一定要团结起来，抱成团，我送你们去精神病院 ), to 
mock PGF as mentally ill users. Some users enjoyed making fun of “the enemy”(敌军) when referring to PGF while adding a 
smiley face emoticon ( ) to indicate the joke. For example, “We just want to ban PG One, but his fans want to kill him ” 
(我们只是想封杀他，没想到他的粉丝是想弄死他 ). Some “onlookers”, a group of bystanders, claimed that they simply 
                                                          
 
2  Water-army refer to online paid ghost posters in China; it is typically composed of a large number of people, who are well organized to “flood” the Internet 
with purposeful comments and articles. 
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watched the fun as the event was unfolding; for example, posting “I am waiting to watch the ‘battle’” (吃瓜吃瓜 ).  
Most fre-
quent con-
tent by 
stakeholder 
groups 
PGF 
(percent of content 
out of all PGF con-
tents) 
TVL 
(percent of con-
tent out of all 
TVL contents) 
GP 
(percent of con-
tent out of all GP 
contents) 
VIP 
(percent of content 
out of all VIP con-
tents) 
Overall 
(percent of content 
out of all contents) 
1 
Whitewashing PG 
One(23.68%) 
“Gutter oil of 
TVL” (50%) 
The friendly 
army (25.14%) 
Reporting this 
event (12.50%) 
The friendly 
army (20.56%) 
2 
Transferring 
Target (19.74%) 
The friendly 
army (50%) 
Attacking PGF or 
PG One (12.48%) 
Response to 
PGF's action 
(12.5%) 
Attacking PGF or 
PG One (11.09%) 
3 
TVL's 
identity (9.21%) 
- 
Onlooker's 
reaction (12.09%) 
Attacking PGF or 
PG One (10%) 
Response to PGF's 
action (10.06%) 
4 Dirty words (7.89%) - 
Response to 
PGF's action 
(10.94%) 
The friendly 
army (8.75%) 
Onlooker's 
reaction (9.91%) 
5 Education (6.58%) - 
Deceiving 
(6.72%) 
PG One's 
candal (7.5%) 
Deceiving (5.92%) 
Table 5. Content by each stakeholder group. 
The various stakeholder groups differ from each other in the frequency of metaphor use, and the rank of their Top 5 topics 
(Table 5). As can be seen in Table 5, PGF aimed at maintaining PG One positive image, which they admire, and thus their 
main focus was whitewashing his actions. TVL only posted on “Gutter oil of TVL” and showed that they are part of “the 
friendly army”. VIP were mainly “reporting the event” progression, saying for example “This topic had been read more than 
20 million times” (话题的阅读量突破 2000万). Interestingly, GP most frequent topics resembles the overall rank of frequent 
content, perhaps due to the fact that they posted the vast majority of posts during this event.  
3)  Trolling tactics   
We further analyzed the use of trolling tactics by the five stakeholder groups (Table 6). Because TVL had only one post in our 
sample, we excluded it from farther analysis. As is shown in Table 6, the most common tactic overall is “Group trolling”, 
followed by “Emotional display”, “Lying”, “Memes”, and “Sarcasm”. PDF preferred to use hostile and insulting words to 
interact with others, such as “Do you have shit in your head?” (你是脑子装大便了吗?), as well as posting “illogical claims”, 
such as, “What’s wrong with taking drugs?” (吸毒怎么了?). GP mainly trolled as part of a group or trolled their target together. 
They tended to use more dog’s head than other groups in reference to “the friendly army”, and liked to troll others by adopting 
“memes” and “sarcasm”, such as “Please sit down, Duxiu Chen”(陈独秀，你坐下). People use this name as a meme just based 
on the meaning of the last two words: the word “Du” means alone and the word “Xiu” means a show. Nowadays, people refers 
to Duxiu as someone who show off alone and does not give others a chance; it typically accuses someone to be showing off 
alone and to be the focus of public attention. VIP users were more likely to troll by “lying” and their trolling involves more 
“name calling” in reference to PGF. For example, “PG One’s brainless fans dare to publicly attack TVL” (PG One的脑残粉
竟敢公开怼紫光阁), or “Must ban this cult” (封杀这种邪教). The top 5 trolling tactics that GP users exhibited are similar to 
the overall results, and it might be due to the fact that GP users dominated this event. 
Tactics by 
stakehold-
ers group 
PGF 
(percent of tactic out 
of PGF tactics) 
GP 
(percent of tactic out of 
all GP tactics) 
VIP 
(percent of tactic out 
of all VIP tactics) 
Overall 
(percent of tactic out of 
all tactics) 
1 Flaming (23.47%) Group trolling (15.86%) Lying (8.99%) Group trolling (13.86%) 
2 
Illogical claim 
(10.20%) 
Emotional display 
(12.62%) 
Name calling (7.87%) 
Emotional display 
(10.02%) 
3 Group trolling (8.16%) Lying (8.58%) Sarcasm (6.74%) Lying (7.80%) 
4 Mockery (8.16%) Memes (7.77%) Mockery (6.74%) Memes (6.68%) 
5 Name calling (8.16%) Sarcasm (6.47%) Group trolling (6.74%) Sarcasm (6.44%) 
Table 6. Tactics by each stakeholder group 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we investigated collective trolling behavior in the Chinese context of Sina Weibo. Results illustrated a well-
organized and well-planned collective trolling when four stakeholder groups assumed different roles, switching between trolls, 
victims and bystanders. Each group utilized a set of tactics in pursuing their goals. Thus, we argue that our study extends 
previous understanding of online trolling as an individual behavior (e.g., Fichman & Sanfilippo, 2016; Shachaf & Hara, 2010) 
to understand trolling also as a coordinated group effort. Our finding indicates that in the context of Chinese collectivistic 
culture, and under perceived lack of online anonymity in China, trolling is not an isolated behaviors of individual trolls, but 
rather a set of group behaviors. This is much in line with the argument that context, in our case Chinese Sina Weibo, shapes 
online behaviors (Sanfilippo, Yang & Fichman, 2017a; Sanfilippo, Yang, & Fichman, 2017b). Furthermore, our study provides 
an account of a Chinese trolling event as trolling behaviors vary during the various stages of the event; participants’ roles 
evolve and change, and so do their tactics. Through this Chinese case study, we documented how stakeholders changed roles 
between trolls, bystanders, and victims during different stages of the event. Users switched roles throughout the same trolling 
event; a user can post as a troll or a victim of trolls during the same trolling event. Trolling behaviors are complex; not all 
trolling is anti-social and not all participants assumed the same role throughout the event. Additionally, we found that in the 
same period and in the same context, members of one stakeholder group may troll each other, just for fun. Thus, while previous 
research documented how socio-technical context impact online trolling, this paper suggests that trolling is a dynamic process 
with a range of manifestations within one socio-technical setting, Sina Weibo PG One case study. Clearly the features and 
context of the technological platform and Chinese socio-cultural norms, together, provide a different representation of the 
trolling phenomenon.  
Future research can aim to gain a better understanding of the evolutionary mechanism of switching role in the same context 
and examine the interaction between trolls in the same group. In addition, future research can compare and contrast insiders’ 
and outsiders’ behavioural tactics in specific trolling events. Finally, future research may compare and contrast the unique 
attributes of online trolling in the East and West. 
In summary, major contributions of this study include an account of 1) collective trolling in Chinese cultural context; 2) role 
switching between trolls, bystanders, and victims; and 3) an account of trolling event over time. We conclude with suggestions 
for future research directions.  
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